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ANTARCTIC WHALING: AUSTRALIA'S 
ATTEMPT TO PROTECT WHALES IN THE 
SOUTHERN OCEAN 
Donald K. Anton*
Abstract: This Article examines Australia's attempt to protect whales in 
the Antarctic Southern Ocean, in an area that almost all states consider 
beyond national jurisdiction. Such an examination is important because 
of the apparently intractable divide on the issue in the International 
Whaling Commission. The Article begins by outlining the evolution of 
the Australian cultural and legal posture toward whaling. It also sets out 
current Australian whaling law, including the establishment of the Austra-
lian Whale Sanctuary in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Australian 
mainland and external territories (including the purported Australian 
Antarctic Territory in the Southern Ocean). The Article then analyzes 
how municipal litigation has been deployed as a protection strategy in 
Australian courts by NGOs in an attempt to protect whales in the Antarc-
tic Southern Ocean. The Article then turns attention to significant legal 
limits and problems connected to this strategy. Finally, the Article con-
cludes by highlighting the benefits and costs associated with the unilateral 
Australian legal approach in the Southern Ocean. 
Introduction 
 This paper considers the effectiveness of the unilateral actions of a 
self-styled “middle power” —in this case Australia—for the protection 
of whales. It is important to reflect on the individual activities of a state 
like Australia because the long-running stalemate under the Interna-
tional Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) between the 
anti-whaling forces and pro-whaling forces is, in my view, probably as 
good as it gets for the foreseeable future. The standoff represents, as 
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David Victor suggests, a Pareto-optimal situation—even if the situation 
is messy and unstable.1 If either side were to achieve the totality of its 
ambitions in the International Whaling Commission (IWC), it is likely 
that it would spell the end of the ICRW as the accepted global mecha-
nism for international cooperation and coordination on whaling.2 In-
deed, at the 2007 IWC meeting, the Japanese delegation announced 
that it was considering withdrawal from the treaty and the Commission 
altogether after years of condemnation and acrimony.3 If the ICRW 
stalemate is as good as it gets for international regulation of whaling, 
then our best hope for whale protection probably lies, at least for now, 
outside the IWC and, as I say, it becomes important to analyze and 
compare the various approaches of individual states. 
 One of the fundamental, long-term threats to whales in the South-
ern Ocean remains the so-called scientific whaling carried out by Japan 
under the second phase of its Whale Research Program under Special 
Permit in the Antarctic ( JARPA II).4 Japan first introduced its Whale 
Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic ( JARPA) in 
                                                                                                                      
1 David G. Victor, Whale Sausage: Why the Whaling Regime Does Not Need to Be Fixed, in 
Toward a Sustainable Whaling Regime 292, 304 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., 2001). 
2 Some have argued that under Articles 65 and 120 of the United Nations Law of the 
Sea Convention the ICRW is the only “appropriate international organization” that states 
can “work through” to meet their duty to cooperate on the conservation, management, 
and study of cetaceans. Jose A. De Yturriaga, The International Regime of Fisheries: 
From UNCLOS to the Presential Sea 131 (1997). The implication seems to be that the 
duty to cooperate is breached by those states that withdraw from the ICRW. See Jon M. Van 
Dyke, Sharing Ocean Resources—In a Time of Scarcity and Selfishness, in Law of the Sea: The 
Common Heritage and Emerging Challenges 3, 21 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2000). As 
William Burke points out, this argument ignores the fact that Article 65 (and mutatis mu-
tandis Article 120) is in the plural and refers to “appropriate international organizations,” 
indicating that the drafters had in mind the possibility of more than one avenue to coop-
erate on cetaceans—large and small. William T. Burke, A New Whaling Agreement and Inter-
national Law, in Toward a Sustainable Whaling Regime, supra note 1, at 51, 54–55; see 
also Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Ninth Session, New York, 
U.S., Feb. 27–Apr. 4, 1980, U.S. Delegation Report (Article 65 “enhances the role of the 
[IWC] (or a successor organization) especially, but not exclusively, with regard to whales.”), 
quoted in Kimberly S. Davis, Note, International Management of Cetaceans Under the New Law of 
the Sea Convention, 3 B.U. Int’l L.J. 477, 512 (1985) (emphasis added). 
3 See The World Today: Japan Threatens to Leave International Whaling Commission, (Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation television broadcast June 1, 2007), available at http://www.abc. 
net.au/worldtoday/content/2007/s1939858.htm. 
4 See generally Int’l Whaling Commission [IWC] Scientific Comm. Meeting, Ulsan, S. Ko-
rea, May 30–June 17, 2005, Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program Under 
Special Permit in the Antarctic ( JARPA II)—Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of 
New Management Objectives for Whale Resources, IWC Doc. SC/57/01 (2006) (prepared by the 
Government of Japan) (providing detailed information on the JARPA II research program), 
available at http://www.icrwhale.org/eng/SC57O1.pdf. The Japanese Institute of Cetacean 
Research (ICR) oversees JARPA II. 
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the 1987–88 Southern Ocean whaling season.5 The principal focus of 
JARPA was Antarctic minke whales, with an initial take of 300 ±10% each 
season.6 Since the 1995-96 season, the annual take has increased to 400 
±10%.7 Through the 2004-05 season, an eighteen year period, over 6800 
Antarctic minke whales were taken in Antarctic waters under JARPA; a 
very large number when compared to a total of 840 whales taken glob-
ally by Japan for scientific research in the thirty-one year period prior to 
the IWC commercial whaling moratorium.8 It is widely reported that 
much of the whale meat generated by JARPA (and now JARPA II) winds 
up in fish markets and on dinner plates, or even as pet food.9
 JARPA II commenced with a two-year feasibility study in June of 
2005.10 JARPA II has four stated program objectives: “(1) monitoring 
of the Antarctic ecosystem; (2) modelling competition among whale 
species and developing future management objectives; (3) elucidation 
of temporal and spatial changes in stock structure; and (4) improving 
the management procedure for Antarctic minke whale stocks.”11 The 
program’s reach has expanded from JARPA to include the lethal study 
of humpback and fin whales.12 It also continues and increases the take 
of minke whales, which were the only whales killed under JARPA.13 
JARPA II also leaves open the possibility of “studying” (i.e., taking) 
other whale species that feed on Antarctic krill, although no other 
species are specifically mentioned.14
 The JARPA II program sets forth the current Japanese lethal limits 
on whale killing in the Antarctic. During the two-year feasibility study, 
the maximum number of permitted kills was 850 ±10% minke whales 
                                                                                                                      
5 Tim Stephens & Donald R. Rothwell, Japanese Whaling in Antarctica: Humane Society 
International Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., 16 Rev. Eur. Community & Int’l Envtl. 
L. 243, 243 (2007). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Resolution on JARPA II, IWC Res. 2005-1 (2005), http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/ 
resolutions/Resolution2005-1.pdf [hereinafter Resolution on JARPA II]; see Stephens & 
Rothwell, supra note 5, at 243. 
9 See Peter Heller, Opinion, Japan’s Whaling Shame, L.A. Times, Dec. 3, 2007, at A17; 
Anger over Whale Pet Food Claims, BBC News, Feb. 16, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ 
sci/tech/4700418.stm. 
10 IWC, 59th Annual Meeting of the IWC, Anchorage, U.S., May 28–31, 2007, [Revised] 
Chair’s Summary Report of the 59th Annual Meeting, at 4 n.3, http://www.iwcoffice.org/_doc- 
uments/meetings/ChairSummaryReportIWC59rev.pdf [hereinafter Chair’s Summary Report 
of the 59th Annual Meeting]. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 4–5 n.3. 
13 Id. at 4 nn.2–3. 
14 Id. at 4–5 n.3. 
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and 10 fin whales.15 The maximum for the full program, which com-
menced in 2007–08, is 850 ±10% minke whales, 50 fin whales, and 50 
humpback whales.16 The addition of fin and humpback whales is a sig-
nificant development and major worry. Humpback whales are listed as 
Annex I species (most threatened) under the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species.17 Fin whales are listed as endan-
gered on the World Conservation Union (IUCN) Red List.18 Another 
concern lies in the fact that species of these whales that are sampled 
might include whales that live in depleted breeding populations.19 The 
permitted amount of minke whale killings has more than doubled un-
der JARPA II.20 Under the lethal component of the program in 2006–
07, 505 Antarctic minke whales and three fin whales were killed.21 In 
2007, a total of 551 Antarctic minke whales were taken under the 
JARPA II program.22 No fin or humpback whales were killed.23
 In 2005, at the annual meeting of IWC, Japan sought approval for 
JARPA II, which as indicated, more than doubles its “scientific” whaling 
in the Antarctic Southern Ocean. It should be noted that the IWC es-
tablished the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary in the Southern Ocean 
in 1994 (although this Sanctuary is not recognized by and does not ap-
ply to Japan because it lodged an objection within the prescribed pe-
riod under Article V.3 of the ICRW).24 The IWC rejected approval of 
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. at 5 n.3. 
16 Chair’s Summary Report of the 59th Annual Meeting, supra note 10, at 5 n.3. 
17 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, art. II, app. I, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, available at http://www.cites.org/eng/ 
app/E-Jul01.pdf. 
18 S.B. Reilly et al., Int’l Union for the Conservation of Nature, IUCN Red List 
of Threatened Species: Balaenoptera Physalus (2008), http://www.iucnredlist.org/ 
details/2478. 
19 Resolution on JARPA, IWC Res. 2007-1, http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolu-
tions/Resolution2007-1.pdf [hereinafter Resolution on JARPA]. 
20 Id. 
21 Press Release, IWC, Day 3 of the International Whaling Commission’s 59th Annual 
Meeting in Anchorage, USA (May 30, 2007), http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/meet- 
ing2007.htm [hereinafter Day 3 IWC 2007 Press Release]. 
22 Press Release, IWC, Day 3 of the International Whaling Commission’s 60th Annual 
Meeting in Santiago, Chile ( June 25, 2008), http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/meeting 
2008.htm [hereinafter Day 3 IWC 2008 Press Release]. 
23 See id. In December 2007, Japan announced that it would suspend, for two to three 
years, its planned hunt of humpback whales. Alan Goodall, Opinion, Inflammatory Actions 
at Sea, Japan Times, Jan. 1, 2008, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo 
20080101a4.html. 
24 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, schedule, ¶ 7(b) n.**, Dec. 
2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72, available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/ 
commission/schedule.pdf. 
2009] Australia's Attempt to Protect Whales in the Southern Ocean 323 
JARPA II. By Resolution 2005-1 (passed by a majority of thirty votes to 
twenty-seven votes with one abstention), the IWC “strongly urge[d] the 
Government of Japan to withdraw its JARPA II proposal.”25 Nonethe-
less, Japan has continued to issue special permits for scientific whaling 
under JARPA II. 
 Resolution 2007-1, adopted at the IWC annual meeting in 2007, 
reiterated IWC concern about the special permit system and specifi-
cally Japan’s institution of the JARPA II program. This resolution ex-
plained IWC concerns about the program and its skepticism about 
the scientific purposes of JARPA II.26 It specifically criticized the ex-
pansion of the program to fin whales and humpback whales and the 
doubling of the take for minke whales.27 The Resolution concluded 
with a request that Japan indefinitely cease to implement the lethal 
components of JARPA II and adopt multiple policy recommendations 
suggested by the IWC.28 New Zealand proposed the resolution and 
numerous other countries sponsored it, including Australia, Great 
Britain, and the United States.29 The resolution received forty votes in 
favor, two against, with one abstaining.30 Japan and twenty-six other 
states refused to participate in the process because they believed the 
resolution was counter-productive to its efforts to “normalize” whaling 
within the IWC.31 The principal development regarding special per-
mit whaling at the 2008 IWC annual meeting was the formal agree-
ment upon a method for reviewing permit applications—including 
                                                                                                                      
25 Resolution on JARPA II, supra note 8; Press Release, IWC, Day 3 of the International 
Whaling Commission’s 57th Annual Meeting in Ulsan, S. Korea ( June 22, 2005), http:// 
www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/meeting2005.htm#day3. 
26 See Resolution on JARPA, supra note 19. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 IWC, 59th Annual Meeting of the IWC, Anchorage, U.S., May 28–31, 2007, Agenda 
Item: Resolution on JARPA, at 1, Doc. IWC/59/27 (May 29, 2007) (prepared by the Government 
of New Zealand), http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/IWC59docs/59-27. 
pdf. 
30 Day 3 IWC 2007 Press Release, supra note 21. 
31 See id. Normalization refers to the attempt by Japan and other whaling nations to have 
the IWC return to its roots as an organization designed to manage sustainable commercial 
whaling, as opposed to retaining the moratorium on commercial whaling in perpetuity. See 
IWC, 59th Annual Meeting of the IWC, St. Kitts and Nevis, June 16–20, 2006, Agenda Item 19: 
Normalizing the International Whaling Commission, at 1–2, Doc. IWC/58/12 ( June 16, 2006), 
http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/IWC58docs/58-12.pdf; Conference on 
Normalization of the International Whaling Commission, Tokyo, Japan, February 13-15, 
2007, Chair’s Summary, at 1, Doc. IWC-M08-INFO2, http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/ 
commission/future/IWC-M08-INFO2.pdf. See generally Mike Iliff, Normalization of the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission, 32 Marine Pol’y 333 (2008) (discussing the progress of “normali-
zation”). 
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the JARPA II program.32 A small, independent expert workshop was 
held in September 2008 to review new proposals, and to review the 
results of existing proposals—including the JARPA II program.33 The 
impasse within the IWC, however, appears as intractable as it has ever 
been. As several astute scholars observe: 
Despite severe condemnation of its whaling policies, Japan 
hews to the position that whaling is no longer an issue of spe-
cies conservation as was the situation in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when several whale species had been over-harvested and ef-
fective measures to protect the endangered species were ur-
gently needed. The government of Japan maintains that most 
of the eighty-plus species of whales are not endangered and 
that many species are abundant and increasing. . . . 
 . . . Japan consistently adheres to its official position that 
its opting out of the IWC regulations and its disregard of the 
moratorium are justified because Japanese whaling is exclu-
sively for “scientific research” purposes and consists of regu-
lated catches of whale species that Japan deems not endan-
gered.34
 Given the logjam in the IWC, can anti-whaling states working out-
side the Commission get any better purchase on the issue? The re-
mainder of this paper considers the individual initiatives of Australia 
outside the IWC.35 In Section I, I outline the evolution of the Austra-
lian posture toward whaling. I also describe Australian whaling law, in-
cluding the establishment of the Australian Whale Sanctuary in the Ex-
clusive Economic Zone of the Australian mainland and external terri-
                                                                                                                      
32 Day 3 IWC 2008 Press Release, supra note 22; see IWC, 2008 IWC Scientific Committee 
Meeting, Santiago, Chile, June 1–13, 2008, Scientific Committee Report—Annex P: Process for the 
Review of Special Permit Proposals and Research Results from Existing and Completed Permits, ( June 
21, 2008), http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/sci_com/SCRepfiles2008 /Annex%20P% 
20FINALsq.pdf. 
33 Day 3 IWC 2008 Press Release, supra note 22; see Int’l Fund for Animal Welfare, 
The 33 Items for Consideration by the Small Working Group (2008), http://www. 
stopwhaling.org (follow “Download IFAW’s Briefing on the 33 Items under discussion at 
this meeting” hyperlink). 
34 Harry N. Scheiber, Kathryn J. Mengerink & Yann-huei Song, Ocean Tuna Fisheries, 
East Asian Rivalries, and International Regulation: Japanese Policies and the Overcapacity/IUU 
Fishing Conundrum, 30 U. Haw. L. Rev. 97, 158 (2007). 
35 Australia continues to work within the IWC, too, most recently releasing a white paper 
on IWC reform. Gov’t of Austl., Whale Conservation and Management: A Future for 
the IWC (2008), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/pub-lications/pubs/ 
iwc-future-paper.pdf. 
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tories (including the purported Australian Antarctic Territory). In Sec-
tion II, I analyze how municipal litigation36 has been deployed as a pro-
tection strategy in Australian courts by NGOs in an attempt to protect 
whales in the Antarctic Southern Ocean. Section III then turns atten-
tion to potential legal limits and problems connected to this strategy. I 
conclude by highlighting the benefits and costs associated with the uni-
lateral Australian legal approach in the Southern Ocean. 
I. The Australian Regulation of Whaling 
 For most of its history Australia was a significant whaling nation.37 
This is perhaps not surprising given its proximity to the major whaling 
waters of the Southern Ocean and the strong economic incentive for-
merly involved. From the early nineteenth century through the 1960s, 
the Australian colonies (and later states) of Tasmania, South Australia, 
Victoria, New South Wales and Western Australia were engaged in whal-
ing, sometimes very heavily, and established numerous onshore whal-
ing stations.38 Australia began shifting its whaling policy in 1978 to fa-
                                                                                                                      
36 There has also been consideration by Australia (and New Zealand) of international le-
gal action in either the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea to challenge the right of Japan to engage in so-called special permit scientific 
whaling under Art. VIII of the ICRW and abuse of such a right. Press Release, Kevin Rudd, 
Federal Labor Leader & Peter Garrett, Shadow Minister for Climate Change, Environment 
and Heritage, Federal Labor’s Plan To Counter International Whaling 1 (May 19, 2007), 
available at http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/media/pressrel/ZG4N6/up- 
load_binary/zg4n62.pdf (“Federal Labor’s plan will . . . [t]ake Japan to international courts 
such as the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea to end the slaughter of whales.”). See generally Andrew Hutchinson, Baleen Out the IWC: Is 
International Litigation an Effective Strategy for Halting the Japanese Scientific Whaling Program, 3 
Macquarie J. Int’l & Comp. Envtl. L. 1, 16–19 (2006) (discussing International Court of 
Justice and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)); Gillian 
Triggs, Japanese Scientific Whaling: An Abuse of Right or Optimum Utilisation?, 5 Asia Pac. J. 
Envtl. L. 33 (2000) (discussing judicial remedies for abuse of rights). On October 20, 2008, 
in testimony before the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, the Attorney-General First Assistant Secretary of the Office of International Law 
stated that the Australian Government was still considering whether to commence interna-
tional legal proceedings and to undertake further surveillance during the 2008–09 Southern 
Ocean whaling season. Estimates (Supplementary Budget Estimates): Hearings before S. Standing 
Comm. on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 42nd Parl. 56–57 (Proof Comm. Hansard 2008) 
(statement of Bill Campbell, QC, First Assistant Secretary, Office of International Law). 
37 See generally Max Colwell, Whaling Around Australia (1969) (surveying the his-
tory of whaling in Australia); William John Dakin, Whalemen Adventurers: The Story 
of Whaling in Australian Waters and Other Southern Seas Related Thereto, from 
the Days of Sails to Modern Times (1934) (same). 
38 See 1 Commonwealth of Australia, Whales and Whaling: Report of the Inde-
pendent Inquiry Conducted by the Hon. Sir Sydney Frost (Austl. Gov’t Publ’g Serv. 
1978), 26–37. The Inquiry is often referred to as the “Frost Inquiry.” 
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vor the protection of whales.39 By 1989, it was staunchly anti-whaling 
with an uncompromising “policy of complete protection for all whales 
. . . .”40 It is today one of the vanguard anti-whaling states, deploying a 
mix of municipal and international law, diplomacy, and policy instru-
ments to promote a complete and permanent ban on all whaling. 
 Because of historical development and the Australian federal di-
vision of maritime jurisdictional competence, the legal regulation of 
whales in Australia has been a federal affair of concurrent jurisdic-
tion—a matter over which both the states and the Commonwealth 
Government legislated.41 Indeed, prior to Federation, what regulation 
existed was provided by the Imperial Parliament of Great Britain42 
and the Australian colonies43 together. The first Australian Common-
wealth federal legislation, the Whaling Act 1935, followed the 1931 
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and established a system of 
licensing.44 It was amended by the Whaling Act 1935-1948 (No. 66) to 
give effect to the 1946 ICRW.45 Section 4 of the Act, presaging con-
temporary Australian jurisdictional stretch, extended the Convention 
to: “Australian waters beyond territorial limits to the Territories of the 
                                                                                                                      
39 The Frost Inquiry prompted a “change in [Australian] policy from one of conservative 
utilisation of whale stocks . . . to one committed to a vigorous and active policy of protection 
of whales . . . .” Nat’l Task Force on Whaling, Commonwealth of Austl., A Universal 
Metaphor: Australia’s Opposition to Commercial Whaling 61 (Env’t Austl. 1997) 
(quoting Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser’s formal response to the Frost Inquiry on April 4, 
1979) [hereinafter A Universal Metaphor], available at http://www.environment.gov.au/ 
coasts/publications/whaling/pubs/whaling.pdf. 
40 R.L.J. Hawke, Prime Minister of Austl., Our Country, Our Future: Statement 
on the Environment 24 (1989). 
41 See, e.g., Whales Protection Act, 1988 (Tas.); Act. No 39, 1935 (Queensl.), discussed in 
J.E. Broadbent, Queensland, 19 J. Comp. Legis. & Int’l L. (3rd ser.) 68, 69 (1937); Act No. 
2361, 1937 (S. Austl.), discussed in E.L. Bean, South Australia, 21 J. Comp. Legis. & Int’l L. 
(3rd ser.) 73, 76 (1939); Act. No. 42, 1925 (Tas.), discussed in C.E.A. Bedwell, Tasmania, 9 J. 
Comp. Legis. & Int’l L. (3rd ser.) 100, 101 (1927); Act No. 15, 1937 (W. Austl.), discussed 
in C.E. Stow, Western Australia, 21 J. Comp. Legis. & Int’l L. (3rd ser.) 81, 82 (1939). 
42 See, e.g., Southern Whale Fishery Act, 55 Geo. 3, c. 45 (1815) (Eng.); Southern 
Whale Fishery Act, 51 Geo. 3, c. 34 (1811) (Eng.); Southern Whale Fishery Act, 42 Geo. 3, 
c. 18 (1802) (Eng.); Southern Whale Fishery Act, 26 Geo. 3, c. 50 (1786) (Eng.). 
43 See, e.g., Dakin, supra note 37, at 33–34 (discussing Tasmanian Act Regulating Whal-
ing, 1838 (Tas.)); Stow, supra note 41, at 82 (discussing the repeal of the Whaling Ordi-
nance of 1860 (W. Austl.) by Act No. 15, 1937 (W. Austl.)). 
44 The 1935 Act also followed the Whaling Industry (Regulation) Act 1934 (U.K.), 
which is one of the few Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament extending the legislative 
powers of the Australian Commonwealth Parliament. See J.Q. Ewens, Book Review, 1 Fed. 
L. Rev. 165, 167 (1964) (reviewing Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and 
Law 1929–49 (1963)). 
45 J.Q. Ewens, Australia: Commonwealth of Australia, 32 J. Comp. Legis. & Int’l L. (3d 
ser.) 60, 69 (1950) (discussing Whaling Act (No. 66), 1950, (Austl.)). 
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Commonwealth, to ships registered in Australia, whether or not such 
ships are in Australian waters of a Territory of the Commonwealth, 
and to all ships over which the Commonwealth has jurisdiction.”46 
Following the passage of Australian whaling regulations under the 
Act, the Japanese Government registered its protest of the regulations 
as they might be applied in Antarctica.47 The extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Act, however, was unclear and the Act was rarely enforced 
in the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT).48
 The Whaling Industry Act 1949 also followed the 1946 ICRW and 
created the Australian Whaling Commission (AWC).49 The Act, how-
ever, was not intended to implement the Convention per se. Instead, 
the AWC was to develop and coordinate whaling in Australia, especially 
Western Australia.50 The AWC was empowered to commence whaling 
as an instrumentality of the Australian Government using a whaling 
station at Babbage Island, off the coast from Carnarvon, Western Aus-
tralia.51 The AWC’s life was short, however, and the operation was sold 
in 1956 and the Act was repealed that same year.52
 Four years later, in 1960, the next piece of federal legislation bear-
ing on whales was enacted.53 Like the 1935 Commonwealth legislation, 
the Whaling Act 1960 was concerned with the rational exploitation of 
whales and the regulation of whaling through licenses and permits for 
whalers. It also had application to waters offshore the AAT, in a manner 
similar to the 1935 Act,54 but again, was never enforced against non-
Australian nationals. 
 Over the next 18 years, public and official sentiment about whal-
ing became strongly oppositional. In 1980, two years after the Frost In-
quiry into Whales and Whaling, the Australian Parliament repealed the 
Whaling Act 1960 and replaced it with the Whale Protection Act 1980. 
                                                                                                                      
46 Whaling Act (No. 66), 1935–48 § 4 (Austl.), quoted in Gillian Triggs, Australian Sover-
eignty in Antarctica—Part II, 13 Melb. U. L. Rev. 302, 309 (1982). 
47 R.A. Swan, Australia in the Antarctic: Interest, Activity and Endeavour 222 
(1961). 
48 See Triggs, supra note 46, at 309. 
49 Whaling Industry Act, 1949 (Austl.). 
50 See Colwell, supra note 37, at 152–53. 
51 See Mark B. Orams & Paul H. Forestell, From Whale Harvesting to Whale Watching: Tan-
galooma 300 Years On, in Recent Advances in Marine Science and Technology ’94, at 
667, 668 (Orpha Bellwood, Howard Choat & Narendra Saxena eds., 1994). 
52 Whaling Industry Act Repeal Act, 1956 (Austl.); Colwell, supra note 37, at 162. 
53 Whaling Act, 1960 (Austl.). 
54 See 118 Parl. Deb., H.R. 2931–32 (1980) (statement of Prime Minister Malcolm Fra-
ser during debate on the Whale Protection Act 1980), as reprinted in 8 Austl. Y.B. Int’l L. 
283, 286 (1983). 
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Adopting the dramatic national policy change favoring whale protec-
tion reflected in the recommendations of the Frost Inquiry, the 1980 
Act eschewed the mere regulation of whaling in favor of conservation 
and prohibited the killing, capturing, injuring, or interfering with ceta-
ceans.55 In terms of jurisdictional reach, initially the Whale Protection 
Act 1980 borrowed the Australian Fishing Zone (AFZ) construct from 
Australian fisheries law56 as the basis for establishing persons subject to 
the Act. The Act applied to Australian nationals regardless of location, 
but only applied to non-nationals when present in the AFZ.57 While the 
Act also applied to “every external territory” —including the claimed 
AAT—waters around the AAT were excluded from the AFZ by the Fish-
eries Management Act 1991.58 Thus, no attempt was made to regulate 
the whaling activities of other states in the Southern Ocean adjacent to 
the AAT.59
 The Whale Protection Act 1980 also made its application subservi-
ent to “the obligations of Australia under international law, including 
obligations under any [international] agreement between Australia and 
another country or countries.”60 In the context of whale protection in 
the Southern Ocean this meant that it was not intended to apply to 
whaling activities that were in conformity with the ICRW. It presumably 
also meant that jurisdiction over non-nationals would also have to be in 
conformity with rules established by the Antarctic Treaty System. 
 Be that as it may, in 1994 Australia formally declared an Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) under the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. The basis of the AFZ was amended to account for 
this development in the Australian fisheries law.61 The AFZ was defined 
to consist of those waters adjacent to Australia and its external territo-
                                                                                                                      
55 Whale Protection Act, 1980, § 9 (Austl.). 
56 Id. § 6(2); see Fisheries Act, 1952, § 4 (Austl.). The AFZ was defined as waters adja-
cent to Australia and its external Territories out to 200 nautical miles, but excluding “ex-
cepted waters” or internal or coastal waters of a state. Fisheries Management Act, 1991, 
§ 4(1) (Austl.); Fisheries Amendment Act, 1978, § 3 (Austl.). 
57 Whale Protection Act, 1980, § 6(2) (Austl.). 
58 See H.R. Standing Comm. on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 36th Parl., 
Australian Law in Antarctica 17 (1992). 
59 This omission was apparently premised on the concern that extending Australian 
jurisdiction over non-nationals in Antarctic waters would endanger the benefits of coop-
eration under the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and Australia’s influence within the Treaty system. 
See id. at 18. 
60 Whale Protection Act, 1980, § 6(3) (Austl.). 
61 See Maritime Legislation Amendment Act, 1994, sched. 1 (Austl.). 
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ries (including the AAT) within the EEZ.62 For fisheries, the 1992 proc-
lamation excepting waters offshore the AATT
                                                                                                                     
63 remained in force under 
the Fisheries Management Act 1991 following the establishment of the 
Australian EEZ. The situation, however, changed for whales in the 
Southern Ocean with the 1994 EEZ declaration. Under the Whale Pro-
tection Act 1980, the jurisdictional basis of the Act’s operation changed 
from the AFZ to the EEZ. As a result, all whaling (conducted by nation-
als and non-nationals alike) in the purported Australian EEZ off the 
AAT became regulated by Australian law. The Act did, however, remain 
subordinate to Australia’s international legal obligations, including the 
ICRW and the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. 
 Australian legal protection for whales was again strengthened in 
1999 with the repeal of the Whale Protection Act 1980 and the en-
actment of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999 (EPBC Act). The EPBC Act takes a comprehensive approach 
in relation to environmental responsibilities about which the federal 
government has deemed appropriate to legislate.64 In connection 
with whales, the Act follows a recommendation of the 1996 National 
Task Force on Whaling. The Task Force urged Australia to “work to-
wards the establishment of a global whale sanctuary in all interna-
tional waters and [EEZs], established under the United National [sic] 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, up to the territorial seas of each 
coastal State . . . through an appropriate amendment to [the 
ICRW].”65
 The EPBC Act takes up the idea of an EEZ whale sanctuary and, 
in order to “assist in the co-operative implementation of Australia’s 
 
62 The definition still excluded the coastal waters of a state and proclaimed “excepted 
waters.” See id. 
63 Proclamation No. S52 of William Hayden, Governor-General of the Commonwealth 
of Australia, as republished in Commonwealth of Austl. Gazette (Canberra, Austl.), Feb. 
14, 1992. 
64 See generally Chris McGrath, Review of the EPBC Act (2006), available at http:// 
www.environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/emerging/epbc-act/pubs/epbc-act.pdf; 
Lee Godden & Jacqueline Peel, The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 (Cth): Dark Sides of Virtue, 31 Melb. U. L. Rev. 106 (2007); Chris McGrath, Flying Foxes, 
Dams and Whales: Using Federal Environmental Laws in the Public Interest, 25 Envtl. & Plan. L. J. 
324 (2008); John Connor, Australia’s New Environmental Law—Questions and Answers, Habitat 
Australia (Aug. 1999), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb4727/is_/ai_ 
n28737967?tag=artBody;col1. 
65 A Universal Metaphor, supra note 39, at x. Peter Bridgewater has argued that the 
idea that each whale should have sanctuary is beyond the dictates of both what is required 
by conservation and the precautionary principle. Peter Bridgewater, Whaling or Wailing?, 
55 Int’l Soc. Sci. J. 555, 558–59 (2003). 
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international environmental responsibilities,”66 the Act establishes an 
Australian Whale Sanctuary (AWS) to help ensure the conservation of 
whales and other cetaceans.67 It gives “formal recognition of the high 
level of protection and management afforded to cetaceans” by the 
Australian government.68 It is an offense under the Act to kill, injure, 
take, interfere with, treat, or possess whales within the AWS.69 The 
AWS includes, inter alia, all waters of the Australian EEZ (other than 
coastal waters of a State of the Northern Territory).70 This includes 
the waters of the EEZ declared adjacent to the AAT, without excep-
tion as to jurisdiction over non-nationals.71 Moreover, the EBPC Act 
does not contain any requirement that it must be read subject to Aus-
tralia’s international obligations. 
 The EPBC Act contains provisions that permit the Minister for the 
Environment to make Recovery Plans for listed threatened species or 
ecological communities.72 A Recovery Plan must contain research and 
management actions that help halt the decline of the species or com-
munity and assist in its recovery and long-term survival.73 A Common-
wealth agency is prohibited from taking action that would breach a Re-
covery Plan.74 To date, five Recovery Plans have been adopted for 
whales (Blue Whales, Fin Whales, Humpback Whales, Sei Whales, and 
Southern Right Whales).75 In each of the Recovery Plans, a threat of 
primary concern to Australia 
is the potential expansion of de facto commercial whaling 
under the guise of scientific whaling. The IWC Convention 
allows member states to issue special permits to kill whales 
for research purposes and then process these animals for 
sale. Since 1986, Japan and Iceland have issued special per-
mits for several whale species as part of their scientific whal-
                                                                                                                      
66 Environment Protection & Biodiversity Conservation (EPBC)Act § 3(1)(e) (1999) 
(Austl.). 
67 Id. § 3(2)(e)(ii). 
68 Id. § 225(1). 
69 Id. §§ 229–230. The offense is punishable by imprisonment up to two years or a fine 
not exceeding one thousand penalty units or both. Id. § 229(2) 
70 Id. § 225(2). 
71 Id. § 5(4). 
72 EPBC Act § 269A(3) (1999) (Austl.). 
73 Id. § 270(1). 
74 Id. § 268. 
75 All recovery plans are available online. See Recovery Plans Made or Adopted—
Common Name Order, http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/threatened/re-covery- 
list-common.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
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ing research programs. The recent expansion of these pro-
grams in the Northern Hemisphere involve the killing of 
various baleen whales including minke, Bryde’s, fin, sperm 
and sei whales.76
In addressing this threat, each Recovery Plan seeks to prevent commer-
cial whaling and the expansion of scientific whaling by continuing to 
support the bans on direct take of the relevant whales and by maintain-
ing its position on promoting high levels of whale protection in all rele-
vant international agreements, including the ICRW, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species, and the Convention on Mi-
gratory Species.77 The Recovery Plans also address threats posed by, inter 
alia, (i) acoustic disturbances, (ii) marine debris and entanglement 
threats, (iii) potential impacts of tourism and whale watching, (iv) 
physical disturbance and development activities (such as ship-strike, 
aquaculture, pollution, recreational boating, and exploration and ex-
traction industries), (v) prey depletion, and (vi) the impact of climate 
change on the species.78
 A significant aspect of the EPBC Act lies in its generous grant of 
third-party enforcement rights.79 If “a person has engaged, engages or 
proposes to engage in conduct consisting of an act or omission that 
constitutes an offence or other contravention of [the] Act or the regu-
lations” an “interested person . . . may apply to the Federal Court for an 
injunction.”80 An “interested person,” in the case of an individual, is: (i) 
an Australian citizen or resident whose interests have been or will be 
affected by the conduct; or, more importantly, (ii) a citizen or resident 
who has engaged in environmental conservation or protection activities 
any time within two years prior to the conduct.81 In the case of an or-
ganization, an “interested person” is defined the same as an interested 
                                                                                                                      
76 Dep’t of the Env’t & Heritage, Australian Gov’t, Blue, Fin and Sei Whale 
Recovery Plan 2005–2010, at 6 (2005) [hereinafter Blue, Fin and Sei Whale Recovery 
Plan]; Dep’t of the Env’t & Heritage, Australian Gov’t, Humpback Whale Recov-
ery Plan 2005–2010, at 6 (2005) [hereinafter Humpback Whale Recovery Plan]; Dep’t 
of the Env’t & Heritage, Australian Gov’t, Southern Right Whale Recovery Plan 
2005–2010, at 6 (2005) [hereinafter Southern Right Whale Recovery Plan]. 
77 See Blue, Fin and Sei Whale Recovery Plan, supra note 76, at 8; Humpback 
Whale Recovery Plan, supra note 76, at 8; Southern Right Whale Recovery Plan, 
supra note 76, at 8. 
78 See Blue, Fin and Sei Whale Recovery Plan, supra note 76, at 6–8; Humpback 
Whale Recovery Plan, supra note 76, at 6–8; Southern Right Whale Recovery Plan, 
supra note 76, at 6–8. 
79 EPBC Act § 475 (1999) (Austl.). 
80 Id. § 475(1). 
81 Id. § 475(6). 
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individual, except that an organization that has engaged in environ-
mental conservation or protection activities within two years prior to 
the conduct must also have these activities as its object or purpose.82 
These provisions have been broadly construed by Australian courts.83
II. Using Australian Courts: The Case of Japanese Whaling 
 Australia and Japan, in particular, have been at loggerheads over 
the whaling issue since Australia adopted its staunch anti-whaling po-
sition. For nearly twenty years, Australia has challenged Japan’s scien-
tific whaling program in the Antarctic Southern Ocean.84 As played 
out in government press releases and the media in Australia, the dis-
pute has harsh overtones of nationalism and a desire to “win” against 
Japan in some sort of international “competition.”85 The same media 
posture seems to prevail in Japan, too.86
                                                                                                                      
 
82 Id. § 475(7). 
83 See, e.g., Booth v. Bosworth (2001) 114 F.C.R. 39 (Austl.). See generally Andrew 
Mcintosh & Lyndall Kennedy, EPBC Act: A Users Guide 25 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing 
judicial review of administrative decisions under the EPBC Act), available at http://www. 
wwf.org.au/publications/epbc_bigguide/. 
84 A Universal Metaphor, supra note 39, at 62. “Australia has consistently questioned 
the basis of the Japanese scientific whaling program and urged the Japanese Government 
to withhold permits for the annual slaughter of several hundred minke whales.” Hawke, 
supra note 40, at 25. 
85 Australian media coverage has often taken the lead from stilted ministerial press re-
leases. See, e.g., Australian Antarctic Division, New Australian Research Shows Japan’s Sci-
entific Whaling is a Sham, http://www.aad.gov.au/default.asp?casid=21638 (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2009) (discussing Press Release, Ian Campbell, Australian Minister for the Envi-
ronment, New Australian Research Shows Japan’s Scientific Whaling is a Sham (Mar. 28, 
2006)). Illustrative media reports include: Geoff Elliott, Japanese Accused as Whale Ban Stays, 
Australian, June 19, 2006, Local, at 3; Selina Mitchell, Japan’s Humpback Hunt Plan a 
“Disgrace”, Australian, June 15, 2006, Local, at 2; Greg Roberts, Most Japanese Whale Kills 
in Aussie Haven, Australian, Aug. 7, 2006, Local, at 4; see also Ian McArthur, Media Por-
trayal of the Cultural Relationship Between Australia and Japan, 60 Austl. J. Int’l Aff. 574, 585 
(2006) (“Australian reports . . . have focused on emotional demands that Japanese vessels 
leave ‘our’ ocean.”). The Australian mass media reports these sorts of international stories 
as if they were sporting events—Australia vs. Japan. See generally Graeme Turner, Making 
It National: Nationalism and Australian Popular Culture (1994) (discussing the 
role of the mass media in shaping Australian nationalism). 
86 See, e.g., Shigeko Misaki, Whaling Controversy Is the Name of the Game, in Inst. of Ceta-
cean Research, Public Perception of Whaling 21, 38 (1994) (stating that anti-whaling 
states practice “ethnocentric arrogance” and “cultural imperialism”); Alan Macnow, Letter 
to the Editor, Misinformed Arguments for a Total Whaling Moratorium, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 
1984, at A30; Norimitsu Onishi, Whaling: A Japanese Obsession with American Roots, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 14, 2007, at A4; see also Sandra Buckley, Whale Meat and Whaling, in Encyclo-
pedia of Contemporary Japanese Culture 564–65 (Sandra Buckley ed., 2006); Arne 
Kalland, Japanese Perceptions of Whales and Dolphins, in Wildlife in Asia: Cultural Per-
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 On January 15, 2008, the Federal Court of Australia issued declara-
tory relief and an injunction against Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd. 
(Kyodo), a Japanese whaling company operating in the Southern 
Ocean. Kyodo operated in the Australian Whale Sanctuary (AWS), 
within the claimed EEZ off the Australian Antarctic Territory (AAT).87 
The court declared that Kyodo had breached sections 229–232 and 238 
of the EPBC Act by killing, treating, and possessing whales in the AWS 
in the EEZ adjacent to the Australian Antarctic Territory.88 It also en-
joined Kyodo from the further killing, injuring, taking, or interfering 
with any Antarctic minke whale, fin whale, or humpback whale in the 
AWS adjacent to the AAT.89
A. Application for Leave to Serve Process in Japan 
 The case was brought in 2004 by Humane Society International 
(HSI), a non-governmental organization, which sued Kyodo for al-
leged illegal whaling under Australian federal law, seeking the decla-
ration and injunction ultimately granted.90 As discussed above, the 
law giving rise to the action is found in the EPBC Act, including legal 
standing for HSI.91 The AWS is established under section 225 of the 
EPBC Act. By virtue of sections 5(1), 5(4), and 5(5) of the EPBC Act, 
section 8 of the Australian Antarctic Territory Act 1954, section 10 of 
                                                                                                                      
spectives 73–85 ( John Knight ed., 2004); Keiko Hirata, Why Japan Supports Whaling, 8 J. 
Int’l Wildlife L. & Pol’y 129, 141–49 (2005). 
87 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd. (2008) 165 F.C.R. 510, 525 
(Austl.). 
88 Id. at 525–26. The description of this case is drawn from an earlier article: Donald K. 
Anton, False Sanctuary: The Australian Antarctic Whale Sanctuary and Long-Term Stability in 
Antarctica, 8 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 17 (2008). 
89 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc., 165 F.C.R. at 525–26. Orders were granted for substituted 
service of the declaratory and injunctive relief on January 18, 2008. Humane Soc’y Int’l 
Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., 2008 WL 225056, ¶ 1 (Fed. Ct. Austl. Jan. 18, 2008). 
Personal service and service by mail were effected in January 2008. E-mail from Chris 
McGrath, Barrister for the plaintiff, to the author (Feb. 4, 2008) (on file with author). 
90 It was alleged that Kyodo had illegally taken approximately 428 whales between 2001 
and 2004 and evidence was presented that whaling would continue under an ongoing 
Japanese whale research program known as JARPA. Statement of Claim ¶¶ 6–7, Humane 
Soc’y Int’l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., (2004) 212 A.L.R. 551 (Austl). The claim was 
amended in 2005 after the release of JARPA II. Amended Statement of Claim ¶ 14, Hu-
mane Soc’y Int’l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd. (2006) 154 F.C.R. 425 (Austl.). 
91 EPBC Act, 1999, § 475(7) (Austl.). Under section 475(7) of the EPBC Act, HSI was 
determined to be an “interested person” for the purpose of standing, presumably because 
during the two years prior to the acts complained of, HSI had engaged in activities related 
to the protection of whales in furtherance of its objects or purposes. Humane Soc’y Int’l 
Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., (2004) 212 A.L.R. 551, ¶ 15; see EPBC Act, 1999, 
§ 475(7)(b) (Austl.). 
334 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 36:319 
the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 and the 1994 Proclamation 
of the EEZ adjacent to the Australian Antarctic Territory, the Austra-
lian Whale Sanctuary applies to the declared AAT EEZ.92 As dis-
cussed, Sections 229 through 230 of the EPBC Act make it an offense 
to kill, injure, take, interfere with, treat, or possess whales without an 
Australian permit, within the AWS.93 The offense provisions expressly 
apply to both Australian nationals and nationals or residents within 
the AWS, but only to non-nationals beyond the outer limits of the 
AWS.94
 One of the elements that the applicant had to satisfy in order to be 
granted leave to serve originating process in Japan was that the viola-
tion complained of took place “in the Commonwealth.”95 Such an in-
vestigation, because dictated by Australian law, allowed the court a rare, 
but missed, opportunity to consider the international legality of the 
exercise of Australian adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction in rela-
tion to the AAT EEZ. Initially, Justice Allsop was prepared to treat as 
conclusive the determination of the boundaries of the Commonwealth 
by the Executive Branch of government, including the EEZ.96
 Before denying the initial application for leave to serve process, 
Justice Allsop took the extraordinary step of inviting the amicus curiae 
intervention of the Attorney-General to provide the government’s views 
on the application of “legislation and treaties involved . . . in the light of 
what might be seen to be Australia’s national interest, including . . . re-
lations between Australia and Japan.”97 The Attorney-General stated 
that “an assertion of jurisdiction by an Australian court over claims 
concerning rights and obligations found in the [EEZ of the AAT] . . . 
would or may provoke an international disagreement with Japan, un-
dermine the status quo attending the Antarctic Treaty, and ‘be contrary 
to Australia’s long term national interests.’”98 According to Justice All-
sop, this view was based on the recognition of three realities by the gov-
                                                                                                                      
92 Proclamation Under Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 ( Jul. 29, 1994) (Austl.), as 
reprinted in F.R.L.I. F2008B00721, available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/Legisla- 
tion/LegislativeInstrument1.nsf/0/A5328250782C80CFCA2574F10082ED57/$file/Proclam- 
ationundertheSeasandSubmergedLandsAct19731994.pdf. 
93 Under section 7 of the EPBC Act, Chapter 2 of the Criminal Code (Austl.), with the 
exception of Part 2.5, applies to all offences against the Act. EPBC Act, 1999, § 7 (Austl.). 
94 Id. §§ 5(3), 224(2). 
95 Fed. Ct. R. 8.2(1) (Austl.). 
96 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc., 212 A.L.R. 551, ¶¶ 19–22 (citing Petrotimor Companhia de 
Petroleos Sarl v. Australia (2003) 126 F.C.R. 354, 361–62). 
97 Id. ¶ 3. 
98 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., 2005 WL 1244815, ¶ 14 
(Fed. Ct. Austl. 2005). 
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ernment. First, Japan would regard enforcement of the EPBC Act 
against Japanese vessels and its nationals in the AAT EEZ as a breach of 
international law.99 Second, the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction 
against foreigners generally in the AAT EEZ, based on the Australian 
territorial claim, would “prompt a significant adverse reaction from 
other Antarctic Treaty Parties.”100 Third, the Australian government 
has not enforced the Australian law in Antarctica against the nationals 
of other state parties, except where there has been voluntary submis-
sion to Australian law.101
 In accepting that exercising jurisdiction might upset diplomatic 
concord under the Antarctic Treaty and be contrary to Australian na-
tional interest, Justice Allsop also stated that any injunctive relief 
granted would ultimately be futile because of “the difficulty, if not im-
possibility, of enforcement of any court order”102 and could place the 
Federal Court “at the centre of an international dispute . . . between 
Australia and a friendly foreign power . . . .”103 As a result, Allsop 
ruled that he “should not exercise a discretion to place the Court in 
such a position” and denied the application for leave to serve process 
in Japan.104
 Significantly, following the intervention of the Attorney-General, 
Allsop appeared prepared to return to consider the merits of the valid-
ity of the Australian claim to jurisdiction in the AAT EEZ as a predicate 
to granting or denying leave to serve process related to an event occur-
ring “in the Commonwealth.”105 Allsop raised the issue of whether all 
“the area” of the Southern Ocean south of sixty degrees south latitude, 
in which the AAT EEZ is claimed, is high seas (in which an EEZ may 
not exist) because Article VI of the Antarctic Treaty protects “the rights 
. . . of any State under international law with regard to the high seas 
                                                                                                                      
99 Id. ¶ 13. Violation would arise presumably because either Australia does not have 
good title to Antarctic territory from which to project an EEZ or, alternatively, the exten-
sion of Australia’s Antarctic claim to the EEZ is prohibited by Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty. See Antarctic Treaty art. IV, opened for signature Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 796, 402 
U.N.T.S. 74 (entered into force June 23, 1961) [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty]. 
100 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc., 2005 WL 1244815, ¶ 13. 
101 Id. Outline of Submissions of the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia as Amicus Curiae, Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., 2005 WL 
1244815, ¶ 14 (Fed. Ct. Austl. 2005). 
102 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc., 2005 WL 1244815, ¶ 28. 
103 Id. ¶ 35. 
104 Id. ¶¶ 36–37. 
105 Id. ¶¶ 2–4. 
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within that area.”106 In fact, however, it seems that Allsop was really in-
terested in how Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty and its prohibition on 
making any “new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territo-
rial sovereignty in Antarctica” might bear on the proclamation of Aus-
tralia to an Antarctic EEZ in 1994.107
 In particular, Allsop noted the submission by the Attorney-General 
that there is a distinction between the “enlargement of an existing 
claim to territorial sovereignty” and the claim of Australia to an Antarc-
tic EEZ: 
[I]t was submitted on behalf of the Attorney-General, [that] 
the claim of Australia to the Antarctic EEZ is not one of sover-
eignty in the full sense over the waters adjacent to the Antarc-
tic Territory (except for the territorial sea), but of claims . . . 
to exercise the rights of exploitation, conservation, manage-
ment and control, and enforcement thereof, given to coastal 
States by UNCLOS. . . . The recognition of the limitations 
(short of full claims to sovereignty) of Australia’s claims to the 
Antarctic EEZ becomes important in assessing whether . . . the 
acts of the respondent and the contraventions of the EPBC 
Act took place “in the Commonwealth.”108
In the end, however, Allsop did not decide on the operative effect of 
Article IV of the Treaty in relation to the declared AAT EEZ.109 Instead, 
he used the submission by the Attorney-General to contrast the con-
trary position of Japan (and most of the rest of the world). Allsop noted 
that “[a]s far as Japan is concerned, the Australian Antarctic EEZ is the 
high seas which is not subject to any legitimate control by Australia un-
der UNCLOS and domestic legislation provided for thereby (such as 
the EPBC Act).”110 The conflicting positions thus contrasted, Allsop 
accepted the Attorney-General’s position that international discord 
would follow by granting leave to serve process, and it became “unnec-
essary to decide whether the Antarctic EEZ is, or can be seen as, ‘in the 
Commonwealth’ . . . .”111
                                                                                                                      
106 See id. ¶ 7 (quoting Antarctic Treaty, supra note 99, art. VI); see infra notes 136–140 
and accompanying text. 
107 Antarctic Treaty, supra note 99, art. IV(2). 
108 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc., 2005 WL 1244815, ¶ 12. 
109 See id. ¶ 42. 
110 Id. ¶ 12. 
111 Id. ¶ 42. Allsop did, however, indicate that the submission of the Attorney-General 
had great force. Id. 
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 Significantly, Allsop noted cultural differences with respect to 
whaling and hinted that the current stigma attached to whaling might 
signal a move away from conservation and sustainable utilization to a 
wish by some to preserve charismatic mega-fauna at all costs.112 Allsop 
explained: 
The whales being killed . . . are seen by some as not merely a 
natural resource that is important to conserve, but as living 
creatures of intelligence and of great importance not only 
for the animal world, but for humankind and that to slaugh-
ter them . . . is deeply wrong. These views are not shared by 
all. . . . They are views which, at an international level, are 
mediated through the Whaling Commission and its proce-
dures, by reference to the Whaling Convention and the views 
of nation States. They are views which contain a number of 
normative and judgmental premisses . . . which do not arise 
in any simple application of domestic law, but which do, or 
may, arise in a wider international context.113
B. The Appeal 
 On appeal, a Full Bench of the Federal Court reversed Justice 
Allsop.114 Taking a more dualistic, traditional Australian approach to 
the underlying legal and international relations issues, none of the 
appellate judges gave any weight to the international political consid-
erations raised by the Attorney-General.115 Even the dissent was in 
agreement on this point, stating that “[c]ourts must be prepared to 
hear and determine matters whatever their political sensitivity either 
domestically or internationally. To approach the matter otherwise, is 
to compromise the role of the courts as the forum in which rights can 
be vindicated whatever the subject matter of the proceedings.”116 The 
majority held that the action was made clearly justiciable by the Aus-
                                                                                                                      
112 Id. ¶ 29. Even those opposed to lifting the moratorium on whaling recognize that 
objections based on threatened, depleted stocks have “a limited duration, as the reintro-
duction of commercial whaling under the [Revised Management Plan] can be scientifically 
justified. In time, the IWC can be expected to authorize commercial whaling of Minke 
whales.” Alexandre Gillespie, The Ethical Question in the Whaling Dispute, 9 Geo. Int’l 
Envtl. L. Rev. 355, 359 (1997). 
113 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc., 2005 WL 1244815, ¶ 29. 
114 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., (2006) 154 F.C.R. 425, 428. 
115 See id. at 430. 
116 Id. at 435. 
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tralian Parliament under the EPBC Act and related authority.117 The 
court had clear jurisdiction. The applicant had clear standing. Ac-
cordingly, jurisdiction could be assumed by service or submission and 
questions of futility would arise, if at all, at the time of the issuance of 
injunctive or declaratory relief.118
C. The Trial 
 On remand, the matter was heard in September 2007 and Kyodo, 
as expected, did not appear. Instead of relying on a default, HSI pro-
ceeded to prove the facts supporting its claim for declarative and in-
junctive relief. Following the guidance provided by the majority of the 
Full Federal Court on appeal regarding public interest injunctions, All-
sop granted the declaration and injunction sought by HSI.119 This, of 
course, raises the prospect of contempt proceedings in Australian 
courts because Kyodo failed to comply with the injunction in the 2007–
08 whaling season.120 It also raises the question of whether the federal 
government is prepared to enforce the injunction in the event of viola-
tion by intercepting and seizing Kyodo ships operating in the AAT EEZ. 
Indeed, it has the potential to bring the unilateral exercise of Austra-
lia’s prescriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement jurisdiction to bear on 
ships and individuals in an area that almost all other states view as the 
high seas and, if they are correct, are thus subject to the exclusive juris-
diction of the flag state.121 Expanding jurisdiction this dramatically is 
clearly inconsistent with uniform past Australian practice not to enforce 
Australian laws against non-nationals in Antarctica.122
                                                                                                                      
 
117 See id. at 431. 
118 Id. 
119 Humane Soc’y Int’l Inc. v. Kyodo Senpaku Kaisha Ltd., (2008) 165 F.C.R. 510, 525–
26 (Fed. Ct. Austl.). 
120 See Federal Court Act, 1976, § 31 (Austl.); Fed. Ct. R. 40 (Austl.). The injunction it-
self cannot be enforced in Japan because Japan does not recognize Australian jurisdiction 
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 Yet, in the late 2007 national election campaign, the recently 
elected Labor government pledged to “[e]nforce Australian law ban-
ning the slaughter of whales in the Australian Whale Sanctuary.”123 Ad-
ditionally, the new Australian Government Solicitor wrote to Justice All-
sop in December 2007 during the trial of the HSI case on instructions 
from the new Attorney-General. The letter stated that the court should 
not rely on the views of the Attorney-General of the previous govern-
ment. Instead, the letter highlighted that the new “Government be-
lieves that the matter would best be considered by the Court without 
the Government expressing its view.”124
 During the 2007–08 Southern Hemisphere summer whaling sea-
son, the Australian government dispatched the Oceanic Viking to moni-
tor whaling in the Southern Ocean, but it neither intercepted nor 
seized any Japanese whaler operating in the AAT EEZ.125 The govern-
ment claimed that the Oceanic Viking was being used to collect evi-
dence that might be used in international litigation challenging the law-
fulness of Japanese whaling for “scientific purposes” under the ICRW.126 
But, given the current government’s position, one is still left to wonder 
if it is only a matter of time before the Australian government will act 
against Japanese ships and Japanese nationals in the AAT EEZ. 
III. The Limits of Australian Domestic Litigation 
 Because the Kyodo case arises under the claim by Australia to an 
EEZ in Antarctica, it is important to consider the underlying legal 
foundation of the claim and the implications it has for the ATS.127 
Legally, only coastal states can assert claims to an EEZ because its de-
limitation is dependent upon the presence of a coast.128 This means 
that the starting point for analysis of any maritime claim is the valid 
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title of a state to the territory from which the maritime claim is ad-
vanced. The Australian Antarctic territorial claim, from which its 
maritime claim to an EEZ in Antarctica derives, is based on an Order 
in Council dated February 7, 1933, by which the British Government 
asserted what it called “sovereign rights” —as opposed to sovereignty—
over “that part of the territory in the Antarctic Seas which comprises 
all the islands and territories other than Adélie Land situated south of 
the 60th degree of South Latitude and lying between the 160th de-
gree of East Longitude and the 45th degree of East Longitude . . . .”129 
The Order also placed the administration of the territory under the 
authority of the Commonwealth of Australia.130 Of course, Australia 
could receive no more than what was validly claimed and placed un-
der Australian administration by the British Government under the 
principle of nemo dat quod non habet.131
A. Article IV and the Declaration of an Antarctic EEZ 
 Without exaggeration, it can be said that the entire edifice of in-
ternational law in Antarctica is built on Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty.132 It has allowed claimants, potential claimants, and non-claim-
ants, all with radically different interests in Antarctica and different 
views about its legal status, to cooperate peacefully for scientific pur-
poses for nearly fifty years. Textually, Article IV(2) has direct bearing on 
the legality of Australia’s declaration of an Antarctic EEZ in 1994 and 
enforcement of the Australian AWS under the EPBC Act. Specifically, 
the treaty prohibits a state from asserting a “new claim, or enlargement 
of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica . . . .”133 The 
effect “would seem to be that EEZs cannot be claimed off [Antarctic] 
territory . . . .”134
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 What then are the implications of this prohibition and how, if at 
all, does it apply to the Australian Antarctic EEZ and the assertion of 
jurisdiction against Kyodo? If, in fact, the effect is to prohibit the decla-
ration of an EEZ in Antarctica, then the entire Kyodo case fails, at least 
at international law, for want of an internationally recognized basis of 
jurisdiction. The nub of the matter though is what constitutes a “claim” 
and what constitutes “territorial sovereignty” under Article IV(2). 
1. “Claims” to Maritime Zones 
 It has been argued that claims to maritime zones in the Antarctic 
are not “claims” in the sense that term is employed in Article IV.135 
Maritime zones are said to exist ipso facto as juridical features of the 
coastal state provided by international law.136 The EEZ, being a mari-
time zone, so the argument goes, thus is not a “claim” or “enlarge-
ment of an existing claim” and so does not fall afoul of Article IV. The 
problem, though, is not as straightforward as this, especially as it con-
cerns the EEZ. 
 The EEZ, unlike ancient customary maritime zones, is a modern 
creation of international law.137 It only slowly emerged during the ne-
gotiation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) adopted in 1982 and, even then, required a period of ges-
tation before confident claims of custom were advanced and accepted.138 
The EEZ, unlike ancient customary maritime zones, is exceptionally 
large. It dramatically extends exclusivity with respect to natural re-
sources up to 200 nautical miles from coastal baselines. In recognition 
of the dramatic enclosing aspects of the new maritime zone (not to 
mention the transfer of wealth in the form of resources), the parties to 
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UNCLOS merely established the maximum limit of the EEZ.139 This 
requires that states seeking to establish an EEZ first have to put the 
world on notice with a declaration of the EEZ claimed.140
 In these circumstances, it is difficult to characterize the declaration 
of an EEZ, in Antarctica or elsewhere, as anything but a claim. The EEZ 
did not exist in 1961 when the Antarctic Treaty came into force. Upon 
its establishment, it did not automatically attach to a coastal state by 
virtue of international law, as may be the case in connection with the 
territorial sea141 or the contiguous zone.142 An EEZ is not created ipso 
facto, but must be declared. Accordingly, under Article IV(2) of the 
Antarctic Treaty it seems clear that the declaration of an EEZ is a 
“claim” that is prohibited, provided the other conditions of the Article 
are satisfied. 
2. New Claim or Enlargement of Claim 
 It needs to be remembered that Article IV(2) prohibits new claims 
or the enlargement of existing claims. This raises the question of how a 
declaration purporting to establish an Antarctic EEZ should be treated 
under Article IV(2). Is it a new claim or is it an enlargement of an exist-
ing claim? The answer depends on the position adopted as to whether 
maritime zones, outside the high seas, exist in the Antarctic Southern 
Ocean.143 If there are only high seas, then the claim would be seen as 
new. If, however, the historic territorial sea and contiguous zone were 
seen as existing prior to entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty, then 
the claim to an EEZ more resembles enlargement. Under either ap-
proach, however, it is clear that a claim exists that is prohibited by Arti-
cle IV. 
 The prohibitions on new or enlarged claims under Article IV 
both have particular salience for Australia’s AAT EEZ. As noted, the 
concept of the EEZ did not exist in 1961 when the Antarctic Treaty 
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came into force. In terms of maritime zones, the most a claimant state 
could have legitimately asserted in 1961 was a three to twelve mile ter-
ritorial sea and a maximum additional twelve mile contiguous zone.144 
With the entry into force of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, a legal 
bar to EEZ claims was established because such a claim would either 
be a new claim or the enlargement of an existing claim.145
 It has been argued that the concept of intertemporal law should 
allow claimant states to take into account developments in the law of 
maritime zones.146 As a consequence, even though no EEZ existed in 
1961, the international law of today permits the declaration of an EEZ, 
which is said to permit claimant states to Antarctic EEZs.147 This ig-
nores, of course, the fact that an EEZ is not a juridical consequence of 
possessing a coast that automatically arises, but must be claimed in the 
sense of a claim prohibited by Article IV as discussed above. It also ig-
nores the application of the principle of the critical date— intertempo-
ral law’s counterpart.148
 Admittedly, the law must move with the times. However, the essen-
tial bargain struck in the Antarctic Treaty was a commitment that noth-
ing done subsequently would prejudice existing claims (or potential 
claims), in exchange for a commitment that no new or enlarged claims 
would be made (and that nothing done subsequently could better ex-
isting or potential claims). To allow the intertemporal law to under-
mine the essence of the treaty—by attributing an EEZ to all claimant 
states by operation of law—would defeat the stability and security cre-
ated by the Treaty, which are its fundamental objects and purposes. 
 Instead, in gauging whether EEZ claims are permissible under 
the Antarctic Treaty, it is first necessary to establish the critical date— 
the date upon which the legal position depends.149 Developments 
with respect to claims subsequent to the critical date are ignored and 
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denied legal effect.150 Upon entry into force on June 23, 1961, Article 
IV of the Antarctic Treaty fixed the date after which the legal situation 
with respect to the permissibility of claims could not be altered.151 Ac-
cordingly, the subsequent development of the concept of the EEZ can 
have no application. 
3. Territorial Sovereignty in Antarctica Versus Sovereign Rights 
 The language of Article IV(2) of the Antarctic Treaty precludes 
new or enlarged claims “to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.” The 
focus here is on the phrase “territorial sovereignty.” Because territorial 
sovereignty does not exist within the EEZ, but instead “sovereign rights” 
pertain,152 and because the Antarctic Treaty is only concerned with 
claims in Antarctica, it has been argued that Article IV(2) does not limit 
a claim to an EEZ.153 The claim to sovereign rights in an EEZ, in other 
words, does not involve “territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.” If this is 
accurate, then despite being a “claim” in the Article IV(2) sense, a 
claim to an EEZ would not violate the Article. 
 In examining the distinction between sovereignty and sovereign 
rights, one is hard pressed to find a legal definition that clearly sepa-
rates the two. It is true that Article 56(1) of UNCLOS elaborates spe-
cific purposes for which exclusive “sovereign rights” in the EEZ may be 
exercised. Likewise, Article 2 of the UNCLOS provides that the “sover-
eignty” of a coastal state extends to the limits of the territorial sea. UN-
CLOS does not provide a definition for either term.154 It does, however, 
confirm strong similarities in connection with the power, and limita-
tions on that power, both entail. Importantly, it establishes that neither 
sovereignty nor sovereign rights are absolute.155 In the territorial sea, 
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the obvious example where sovereignty must give way is the right of 
foreign flag vessels to exercise the right of innocent passage.156 In the 
EEZ, other states continue to enjoy the freedom of navigation, over-
flight, and the laying of submarine cables, despite the coastal state’s 
exclusive sovereign rights over all natural resources.157
 Perhaps more important are the similar aspects, in terms of power, 
thought to be entailed in the concepts of sovereignty and sovereign 
rights, especially as those rights are applied in the EEZ. Fundamentally, 
both encompass the power entailed in the principle of permanent sov-
ereignty over natural resources. Both entail, in other words, the exclu-
sive control over, and access to, all the natural resources within their 
respective ambits, subject to the limits of international law.158 The po-
litical and economic consequences of such power are readily apparent, 
both for individual states able to declare an EEZ and for the broader 
international community. The enclosure of the oceans by virtue of the 
EEZ has given individual states exclusive control over approximately 
thirty-six percent of the total area of the sea.159 This area “contains over 
ninety per cent of all presently commercially exploitable fish stocks 
[and] about eighty-seven per cent of the world’s known submarine oil 
deposits . . . .”160
 Likeness in terms of power, rather than difference, is no doubt 
one reason why states are only accorded “sovereign rights” over natu-
ral resources found in their territory under the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity.161 Likeness in terms of power, rather than difference, 
is also no doubt one reason that the British claim to territory in the 
Antarctic, to which Australia succeeded, is couched in terms of “sov-
ereign rights,” not “sovereignty.”162 For these reasons it is logical and 
appropriate that Article IV(2) applies with similar force to limit the 
extension of EEZ maritime claims. 
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 In Australia’s case, however, there is the additional reason that its 
claim in Antarctica is limited to “sovereign rights.” As detailed above, 
in laying claim to the territory Australia succeeded to as the AAT, the 
British Government merely asserted “sovereign rights” in Antarctica, 
not “sovereignty.”163 By definition, any extension of Australia’s claim 
relates to sovereign rights. This means that in order for Article VI(2) 
to have any application for Australia, it must be directly applicable to 
claims to sovereign rights, including sovereign rights in an EEZ. 
B. Article VI 
 A key objection to maritime claims to an EEZ in Antarctica relies 
on the fact that under Article VI nothing in the Antarctic Treaty can 
“prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, 
of any State under international law with regard to the high seas” in 
Antarctica.164 A number of states maintain that this means all Antarctic 
seas are to be considered high seas because there are no recognized 
sovereign coastal states within the ATS.165 In other words, for the 187 
states that do not recognise territorial claims in Antarctica, all marine 
areas adjacent to Antarctica are high seas because there are no coastal 
states.166 The counter position, elaborated by Stuart Kaye and Don 
Rothwell, is that Article VI is silent about which seas are to be consid-
ered high seas under the Antarctic Treaty, and instead it should be “in-
terpreted as merely seeking to preserve rights in those high seas, wher-
ever they might be.”167
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 For the argument here, let us accept arguendo Australia’s territorial 
claim in Antarctica. Let us also accept that Article VI itself provides no 
guidance as to which seas south of sixty degrees south latitude are high 
seas. That does not mean, however, the area of high seas in the Antarc-
tic Southern Ocean cannot be determined. As demonstrated above in 
connection with Antarctic EEZ claims, the existence of legal rights and 
obligations must be determined in light of the critical date of June 23, 
1961.168 Freedom on the high seas at that time could have been lim-
ited, at most, by a twelve nautical mile territorial sea.169 Anything be-
yond that point, subject to the limited jurisdiction of the coastal state in 
the further contiguous zone, would have been deemed the high seas. 
Accordingly, the assertion of an EEZ in Antarctica that exceeds twelve 
nautical miles appears contrary to Article VI of the treaty. 
C. Article VIII and Jurisdiction 
 Even in the unlikely event that a declaration of an Antarctic EEZ is 
permissible, the exercise of jurisdiction over non-nationals (at least be-
longing to treaty parties such as Japan that do not recognise Antarctic 
claims) is prohibited either by Article VIII of the Antarctic Treaty, cus-
tomary international law, or both. Turning to Article VIII first, it pro-
vides: 
In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under 
the present Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective 
positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction 
over all other persons in Antarctica, observers . . . and scien-
tific personnel . . . and members of the staffs accompanying 
any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of 
the Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect 
of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in Antarctica 
for the purpose of exercising their functions.170
 Clearly, as written, Article VIII only addresses observers, scientific 
personnel, and their staff. For these individuals, jurisdiction (pre-
scriptive, adjudicative, and enforcement) can only be exercised by the 
state of nationality. This would be true of scientific personnel and 
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their staffs engaged in research of the Antarctic marine ecosystem.171 
Because Kyodo is engaged in what it claims is “scientific” whaling un-
der the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling—a 
claim, as seen above, strongly disputed by many172—it might argue 
that Article VIII is directly applicable in the sense that those conduct-
ing the whaling for Kyodo are scientific personnel and their staff.173 
As such, Australia would have no international basis for the exercise 
of jurisdiction over Kyodo under the EPBC Act. 
 Regardless of the merits of this argument, the sounder and longer 
term view requires that jurisdiction in Antarctica over non-nationals 
(regardless of status) ordinarily be prohibited on other grounds. Look-
ing to treaty interpretation, the practice of parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty, including Australia and all the other claimant states, has been 
consistently and uniformly to refrain from exercising adjudicative and 
enforcement jurisdiction over non-nationals of states party to the Ant-
arctic Treaty. Extensive research (albeit and unfortunately limited to 
the English language) has failed to disclose any instance subsequent to 
the entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty where a state has prosecuted 
and punished (under civil law or criminal law) a non-national of a state 
party, without consent of the state of nationality, for action taken in the 
treaty area. 
 Under Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (Vienna Convention), nearly fifty years of apparently consis-
tent practice by all states must have a bearing on how the parties view 
Article VIII of the Antarctic Treaty and on its proper interpretation.174 
The obvious and evident result of this long and consistent practice is 
that Article VIII is now to be interpreted as prohibiting, as against all 
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non-nationals, adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction for acts or 
omissions in the treaty area. A similar, if somewhat reverse, applica-
tion of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention is analysed by An-
thony Aust in connection with charter services under Article 5 of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation.175 Article 5: 
does not require a charter airline to obtain permission to land 
en route, provided it does not pick up or set down passengers 
or cargo. However, the practice of the parties over many years 
has been to require charter airlines to seek permission to land 
in all cases, and the article is now so interpreted.176
 Even if this interpretation of Article VIII of the Antarctic Treaty 
were to be rejected, an alternative argument militates in favour of lim-
iting the exercise of adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction to na-
tionals in the Antarctic treaty area. This argument relies on customary 
international law. Just as the practice of states over time is important 
in the interpretation of a treaty, it is also a key element in the genera-
tion of customary international law.177 In terms of practice, the uni-
form and consistent position of states, at least since 1961, if not be-
fore, has been to refrain from exercising adjudicatory or enforcement 
jurisdiction against non-nationals.178 Just as importantly, all the claim-
ant states, and in particular the “specially affected states” claiming 
Antarctic EEZs, have engaged in this practice of abstention.179
 The more difficult question is why states have uniformly and con-
sistently acted this way. The answer to this question is, of course, es-
sential because of the need to establish the requisite opinio juris ac-
companying the practice. Accepting a positivist’s view of the situation, 
only if the answer is that states are refraining to exercise adjudicatory 
and enforcement jurisdiction because of a sense of legal obligation, 
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can we conclude that a customary norm of preclusion of such exer-
cise exists. I suspect that for the vast majority of states for which we 
could find evidence, the practice would be engaged in because of an 
underlying belief in its legal requirement. 
Conclusion 
 For those, like me, who oppose unsustainable commercial whal-
ing (or any whaling of threatened species) there is an admitted attrac-
tion to possibilities of protective action for whales in the Southern 
Ocean under Australian law based on Australia’s historic claims to 
sovereign rights in Antarctica. It would allow the circumvention of the 
apparently intractable paralysis in the IWC. It would allow for rela-
tively quick independent third-party review and the order of any nec-
essary interim and warranted permanent relief. Provided the neces-
sary political will, it would allow for effective enforcement of any relief 
ordered. In all these matters, Australia and other states committed to 
the conservation of whales have much at stake. 
 But there are significant downsides that, in my view, outweigh the 
attractions of unilateral action under Australian law. Most importantly, 
the exercise of adjudicative and enforcement jurisdiction in the Antarc-
tic AWS significantly risks, first, the continuing stability of the Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS) and the broader environmental values it serves. As 
I have written, the long-running battle between the anti-whaling forces 
and whalers is being played out in Australian courts because of the fail-
ure to address the issues within what is seen as a “dysfunctional” whal-
ing regime.180 However, because the Australian litigation involves what 
most other states will view as the unlawful exercise of Australian juris-
diction in the Southern Ocean, there is a very real prospect that an on-
going whaling dispute will have a detrimental “ripple effect” on the 
ATS (and perhaps even beyond).181 The danger is that the issue of 
whales and whaling might distort and obscure the larger environmental 
picture in Antarctica. Private litigation, based on an internationally 
disputed claim to sovereign rights over Antarctic territory and a further 
contested claim to an EEZ appurtenant to that territory, ought not to 
serve as a proxy for cooperative (and hopefully effective) international 
management of the Antarctic environment. 
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 The negative incentives presented by the unilateral exercise of 
Australian jurisdiction over whales in the Southern Ocean are also 
dangerous. The exercise of jurisdiction by Australia over non-nationals 
and resources in the Antarctic AWS threatens in the longer term other 
jurisdictional claims over resources, and probably not for the conserva-
tion and protection of those resources, but for their exploitation. The 
big danger is that if other states follow Australia’s lead in claiming 
sovereign rights and exercising attendant jurisdiction, the chances of 
natural resource over-exploitation and environmental harm in the Ant-
arctic is increased. It will, I believe, in the long run exacerbate the like-
lihood of a scramble for important, scarce, and ultimately economically 
viable resources. 
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